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Abstract
Anew approach to the $\mathrm{P}$ versus $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ problem based on $\mathrm{G}^{\cdot}.\propto 1\mathrm{e}1’\mathrm{s}$ incompleteness theorem and forcing
is proposed. The assertion that the paradox of the unexpected hanging can be regarded as akind
of partial extension of the liar paradox is applied. Pronouncements are formalzed in the language
of extended Buss’ bounded arithmetic. The pronouncements are shown to be both consistent and
inconsistent when $\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ and an assumption hold. As aconsequence, it is proved that $\mathrm{P}\neq \mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ is
reducible ffom another separation problem of an ideal from aBoolean algebra.
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1Introduction
The structure of weak arithmetic systems described by $S_{2}^{\dot{l}}$ , which is called bounded arithrnetic, is closely
related to the structure of the polynomial time hierarchy. $\mathrm{P}\neq \mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ is said to be deducible from the
separation of bounded arithmetic theories. One $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{U}$-known method for separating arithmetic theories
combines G\"odel’s incompleteness theorem and the truth definition (cf. \S 7.6 in [3], page 140 in [7], and
\S 10.5 in [8] $)$ . However, the separation of bounded arithmetic theories has not yet been proved using
such amethod. This is because the truth definition of $\Sigma^{b}.\cdot$-formulas cannot be represented by abounded
formula in the language of $S_{2}$ (cf. [9]).
We generalize the above separation method by applying the paradox of the $une\varphi ected$ hanging [4],
which is as follows. “One Saturday, the prisoner was told by the judge, ‘You will be hanged at noon
on one day next week. You will be hanged on aday you cannot predict.’ The prisoner’s lawyer proved
that the hanging could not be executed by making the following argument: ‘If the day of the hanging
is Saturday, the prisoner will be able to predict it Friday afternoon because Saturday is the last day
of the next week. This contradicts the judge’s second pronouncement. Saturday is thus excluded. The
execution can only take place on aday before Saturday. In the same way, each final day can be eliminated
one by one.’ ”
It is now asserted that this problem is not aparadox because the day of the hanging is not predictable
by the prisoner even if he (or she) makes full use of all the information contained in the pronouncements
(cf. [2]). The author agrees with this assertion. However, this problem can still be applied to the
separation of logical systems, given the following observation: The paradox of the $une\varphi ected$ hanging
can be regarded as a kind of partial extension of the liar paradox. The separation method based on
G\"odel’s incompleteness theorem and the truth definition can be naturally generalized by applying this
observation. If we apply this generalized method to bounded arithmetic theories, the role of the truth
definition is replaced by forcing. The $\mathcal{M}$-generic maximal filter constructed by forcing on bounded
arithmetic naturally corresponds to the number meaning the day of the hanging.
If we apply this method to the $\mathrm{P}$ versus NP problem, it is proved that $\mathrm{P}\neq \mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ is reducible ffom
another separation problem of an ideal Ifrom aBoolean algebra $B$ . (The precise definitions of $B$ and I
will be given in \S 6.2.) The proof sketch is described as follows. Suppose $\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ and $B\neq \mathrm{I}$. There is an
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extended Buss’ bounded arithmetic in which $\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ is made true by adding an axiom representing
$\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$.
Furthermore, we formalize the two pronouncements in the language of this theory. First, we construct a
model of the theory, on the assumption of $B\neq \mathrm{I}$ , such that the first pronouncement is true in it. Second,
we show that the second pronouncement is proved in the theory. (This means that the pronouncements
are consistent.) Finally, we prove that $0=1$ is true in the model by developing the lawyer’s argument.
(This means that the pronouncements are inconsistent.) This is trivially acontradiction. Hence, we can
conclude that $B\neq \mathrm{I}$ implies $\mathrm{P}\neq \mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$.
2Paradox of the unexpected hanging
The paradox of the unexpected hanging is as follows [4]:
“The prisoner was sentenced by the judge on Saturday, ‘The hanging will take place at noon on one
of the seven days of next week. But you will not know which day it is until you are so informed on the
morning of the hanging. ’
The judge was known to be aman who always kept his word. The prisoner, accompanied by his
lawyer, went back to his cell. After careful consideration, the lawyer proved that the judge’s sentence
could not possibly be carried out. ‘They obviously cannot hang you next Saturday because Saturday
is the last day of the week. On Friday afternoon you would still be alive and you would know with
absolute certainty that the hanging would be on Saturday. You would know this before you were told so
on Saturday morning. That would violate the judge’s decree.’
‘Saturday, then, is positively ruled out. This leaves Friday as the last day they can hang you. But
they cannot hang you on Friday because by Thursday afternoon only two days would remain: Friday
and Saturday. Since Saturday is not apossible day, the hanging would have to be on Friday. Your
knowledge of that fact would violate the judge’s decree again. So Friday is out. This leaves Thursday as
the last possible day. But Thursday is out because if you’re alive Wednesday afternoon, you’ll know that
Thursday is to be the day.’
‘In exactly the same way you can rule out Wednesday, Tuesday and Monday. That leaves only
tomorrow. But they cannot hang you tomorrow because you know it today.’
In brief, the judge’s decree seems to be self-refuting. There is nothing logically contradictory in the
two pronouncements that make up his decree; nevertheless, it can not be carried out in practice.”
When Garner published the details of this paradox in an article titled “Mathematical Games” in
Scientific American [4], there was agreat public response. We will first rearrange the pronouncements
from the viewpoint of application and make some assertions about the paradox. These interpretations
do not relate to the work by Gardner.
The pronouncements are rearranged as follows:
. First pronouncement
The hanging will take place on one of the seven days of next week.. Second pronouncement
The day of the hanging cannot be predicted by the prisoner.
The paradox of the unexpected hanging consists of two contradictory assertions:. Judge’s assertion
The pronouncements are consistent.
. Lawyer’s assertion
The pronouncements are inconsistent.
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Most people do not perceive an incompatibility between the pronouncements. Since the paradox
of the unexpected hanging is said to be aproblem of time, this imperception $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\alpha \mathrm{s}$ our unconsciousrecognition of time. Results of an inferenoe made now should be taken as ahistorical fact when makingan i$\mathrm{n}$ference in the future. When an inference made now is based on the results of an inference madein the future, the premise of the inference made now is changed to match the results of the inferencemade now. Thus, the inference including atime element may contain inconsistency if the inference isnot restricted. This restriction can be represented by choosing the Pria)ner’s ability to infer as aweaksystem. The lawyer uses atacit understanding of the prisoner’s ability to infer in his proof.
Conversely, this paradox can b$\mathrm{e}$ used to show that the prisoner’s ability to infer is weak. To show this,we first prove that the judge’s assertion is right and then that the lawyer’s assertion is right based on theassumption that the prisoner’$\mathrm{s}$ ability to infer is sufficiently strong. More simply, if both the judge’s andlawyer’s assertions are proved baeed on the assumption that the prisoner’s ability to infer is sufficientlystrong, we can conclude that the prisoner’s ability to infer is weak. With this method, we can intuitivelyprove that an inference including the notion of time is properly weaker than astandard one.
Furthermore, we can describe this paradox as follows:
Assertion. The structure of the inference deducing inconsistency used by the lawyer in the paradox ofthe unexpected hanging is aesentially the same ae the structure of the inference deducing inconsistency inthe liar paradox. The lawyer’s inference consists of seven iterations of the inference in the liar paradox.
The paradox of the unexpected hanging can be regarded as akind of partial extension of the liar paradoxin this sense.
Explanation. The inferences used in the liar paradox and the paradox of the unexpected hanging are
compared. We first describe the one found in the liar paradox.
$\phi$ $\Leftrightarrow$ $u\phi$ is false”
$\Leftrightarrow$ $u\phi$ is true” is negative.
The upper arrow is the definition of $\phi.$ The lower arrow is the rewriting $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\omega \mathrm{r}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ to the definition of“false.” The inference deducing inconsistency from the positive assertion of $\phi$ is as follows.
Begin
1. $\phi$ (assumption)
2. $u\phi$ is true.” (immediately implied by 1)
3. If “$\phi$ is true,” then $\phi$ is negative. (by the definition of $\phi$)
4. $\phi$ is negative. (from 2and 3)
This contradicts 1.
End
To describe the paradox of the unexpected hanging, we first introduce the symbok used in the inference.The prisoner’s ability to infer is denoted by $T$, alogical system. The day of the hanging is labeled0, 1, $\cdots,6$ . The first day is labeled 0and called the 0–th day. $\phi(x)$ is the formula used to determine theday of the hanging. On the afternoon of the $(x-1)$-th day, the prisoner knows that the hanging has not
been executed before the $x$-th day. Hence, the prisoner’s ability to infer on the afternoon of the $(x-1)$-th
day, denoted by $T_{x}$ , can be represented by $T+\{(\forall y<x)\neg\phi(y)\}$ .
The first pronouncement can be represented as follows:
$(\exists x<7)\phi(x)$ .
The second pronouncement can be represented as follows:
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For all $x$ such that $x$ is less than 7,
$\phi(x)$ $\Rightarrow$
“$\phi(x)$ is not predictable by $T_{x}.\prime\prime$
$\Leftrightarrow$
“$\phi(x)$ is predictable by $T_{x}’’$ is negative.
The inference used by the lawyer is naturally described as follows:
Begin
$x:=6$.
1. $(\exists y\leq x)\phi(y)$ (the first pronouncement)
2. “$\phi(x)$ is predictable by $T_{x}.$” (immediately implied by 1)
3. If “$\phi(x)$ is predictable by $T_{x},$”then $\phi(x)$ is negative. (by the second pronouncement)
4. $\phi(x)$ is negative. (from 2and 3)
If $x=0$, then 4contradicts 1, else $(\exists y\leq x-1)\phi(y)$ is obtained.
$x:=x-1$ and go to 1.
End
Comparing these inferences, the assertion is easily grasped. “$\phi$ is true” in the liar paradox corresponds
to “$\phi(x)$ is predictable by $T_{x}$”in the paradox of the unexpected hanging. $\square$
Aspecial framework, like temporal logic, is not needed to formalize this paradox. However, the
notion of predictability must be expressed. Since it is natural to express this notion by provability, a
strong theory in which meta-notions can be represented should be used to formalize this paradox. Peano
arithmetic is one such theory. However, the pronouncements will be inconsistent if expressed naturally
in Peano arithmetic because Peano arithmetic is too strong for formalizing them. bounded arithmetic is
better because it is neither too weak nor too strong.
3Relation to the classical separation method
Our separation method using the paradox of the unexpected hanging looks quite new. However, it is
related to the well-known classical method (cf. \S 7.6 in [3]). We will now explain the relation between
our proof and the one for $I\Sigma_{1}\neq I\Sigma_{2}$ , because our plan for proving the main theorem corresponds to the
structure of the proof of $I\Sigma 1\neq I\Sigma 2$ .
The proof consists of two statements.
1. $I\Sigma_{2}\vdash Con(I\Sigma_{1})$
2. $I\Sigma_{1}\forall Con(I\Sigma_{1})$
Intuitively, $I\Sigma_{1}$ and $I\Sigma_{2}$ are separated by $Con(I\Sigma_{1})$ . In other words, both consistency and inconsistency
of $I\Sigma_{1}+\{\neg Con(I\Sigma_{1})\}$ are proved based on the assumption $I\Sigma_{1}=I\Sigma_{2}$ . Inconsistency is proved by
showing that there is no model of $I\Sigma_{1}+\{\neg Con(I\Sigma_{1})\}$ , and the truth definition of $\Sigma_{1}$-formulas plays
an important role in the proof. Consistency is proved by G\"odel’s incompleteness theorem; this proof is
based on the liar paradox.
In our main proof, we will use $T$, which will be defined in the next section, instead of $I\Sigma 1(=I\Sigma 2)$ .
Both consistency and inconsistency of $T+$ { $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$ two formalized pronouncements} will be proved. Here, $T$
is roughly defined as the theory $S_{2}+\{\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}\}$. Inconsistency is proved by the lawyer’s argument, based
on an extension of the argument of the liar paradox. Consistency is proved by showing that there is a
model of $T+$ { $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$ two formalized pronouncements}, that can be proved by forcing. Our method thus
twistingly corresponds to the proof of $I\Sigma 1\neq I\Sigma 2$ .
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4Relation to P versus NP problem
We have explained why the paradox of the unexpected hanging is related to separation of logical systems.
We will now intuitively explain why it is related to the $\mathrm{P}$ versus $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ problem.
As aconcrete example of $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$-complete problems, we consider the clique problem (cf. page 47 in [5]).
Given agraph $(V, E)$ and apositive integer $J\leq|V|$ , let $V_{0},$ $V_{1},$ $\cdots,$ $V_{n}$ be an enumeration of subsets of
$V$ (vertex). Then, the clique problem consists of $n+1$ subproblems. For each $i\leq n$ , it is easily checked
whether $V_{1}$. is aclique and $J\leq|V_{*}.|$ , so each subproblem is in P. In other words, the clique problem is
aset of many subproblems such that each of them is in P. It is believed that there is no polynomial
time computable function calculating a true one ffom $n+1$ subproblems (i.e. $\mathrm{P}\neq \mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$) $.$ This means that
there is no algorithm much better than checking them one by one. If $\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$, there is apolynomial time
computable function such that it calculates atrue one from $n+1$ subproblems.
Notions in the paradox of the unexpected hanging can be expressed by using notions of computational
theory. For example, the prisoner’s ability to infer is expressed by aTuring machine, predictability is
expressed by non-deterministic polynomial time computabih.ty, and so on. “Is the day of the hanging
predictable by the prisoner’s ability to $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}^{7}$ ” can then be considered as aproblem of computational
complexity. Here, the length of the input is a $\log$ of the maximum time to execute, because pronounce-
ments can be coded by words whose length is bounded by apolynomial length of a $\log$ of the maximum
time to execute. On the other hand, the proof by the lawyer can be expressed by an instantaneous
description (ID). However, the length of the $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{D}$ is exponentially longer than the input length, because
he eliminates candidates of the hanging one by one. Since we now regard predictability as polynomial
time computability, that hanging will occur on the ffist day is perhaps unpredictable by the prisoner.
(Because the prisoner needs an exponential length $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{D}$ to prove that the hanging is the first day.) However,
if $\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$, there may be apolynomial time computable function such that it calculates the day of the
hanging, like the case of the clique problem.
5Expressing notions in the paradox of the unexpected hanging
We show definitions how we express the notions used in the paradox of the unexpected hanging in bounded
arithmetic.
5.1 Prisoner’s ability to infer
The prisoner’s ability to infer is expressed by acomputational system such as aTuring machine. In
this paper, the prisoner’s ability to infer is expressed by atheory $T$ of bounded arithmetic defined by
extending theory $S_{2}$ . Let $\overline{S}_{2}$ be atheory such that the language of $\overline{S}_{2}$ has all symbols in the language
of $S_{2}$ plus all symbols introduced in \S 2.4-\S 2.5 of [3] plus symbols for representing $\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ later, and the
axioms of $\overline{s}_{2}$ has all axioms of $S_{2}$ plus all axioms defining symbols introduced in \S 2.4-\S 2.5 of [3]. The
language of $T$ is completely the same as that of $\overline{S}_{2}$ . $T$ has all the axioms in $\overline{S}_{2}$ . The only difference
between $T$ and $\overline{S}_{2}$ is that $T$ contains axioms representing $\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$. This approach was also used by Takeuti
[11].
Definition 1 (The definition of $(\exists x\leq \mathrm{t}(a))\mathrm{A}(x,a)$ ) $(\exists x\leq \mathrm{t}(a))\mathrm{A}(x,a)$ is an $NP$-complete formula
$w.r.t$. $\overline{S}_{2}$ such that $\mathrm{t}$ is a term and $\mathrm{A}$($a_{1}$ ,a2) $\dot{u}$ a sharply bounded formula in the language of $S_{2}$ . Thatis, for any $\Sigma_{1^{-}}^{b}fomulaA(a)$ in the language of $\overline{S}_{2}$ , there is a polynornial tirne computable function $f_{A}(a)$such that
$\overline{S}_{2}\vdash A(a)rightarrow(\exists x\leq \mathrm{t}(f_{A}(a)))\mathrm{A}(x, f_{A}(a))$.
Remark. We selected one $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$-complete formula $(\exists x\leq \mathrm{t}(a))\mathrm{A}(x,a)$ and used it consistently in the
following argument. $T$ is constructed by adding anew axiom for it, so $T$ depends on the choice of this
NP-complete formula. The main theorem will hold independently of its selection. The reader who wants
to avoid confusion due to this ambiguity can choose aconcrete formula; $(\exists x\leq \mathrm{t}(a))\mathrm{A}(x,a)$, for example,
is defined as aformalization of the class of clique problems. However, we do not know of any concrete
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form of $\mathrm{f}(a)$ that can be used in our next definition. $\square$
Definition 2(Definition of f) Since $P=NP$, there is a polynomial tirne computable function
$\mathrm{f}$ that
satisfies
$(\exists x\leq \mathrm{t}(a))\mathrm{A}(x, a)rightarrow \mathrm{f}(a)\leq \mathrm{t}(a)\wedge \mathrm{A}(\mathrm{f}(a), a)$.
We selected such a function, $\mathrm{f}(a)$ , and use it consistently in this paper.
Now we define $T$ .
Definition 3(Definition of $T$) The language of $T$ is the sarne as the language of
$\overline{S}_{2}$ . $T$ has all the
axioms of $\tilde{S}_{2}$ . Additionally, $T$ has the following new aioms:
$x\leq \mathrm{t}(a),$ $\mathrm{A}(x, a)arrow \mathrm{f}(a)\leq \mathrm{t}(a)$ , and
$x\leq \mathrm{t}(a),$ $\mathrm{A}(x, a)arrow \mathrm{A}(\mathrm{f}(a), a)$ .
Furthermore, $T$ has defining axioms to calculate the value of $\mathrm{f}(x)$ for each value of $x$ : these aioms are
introduced using limited iteration (\S 1.1 in $f\mathit{3}J$).
5.2 Judge
The judge is expressed by the ‘universe’ in which the prisoner thinks about the day of the hanging. It is
naturally expressed by amodel of $T$ . However, it is not necessarily astandard model. In this paper, a
non-standard arithmetic model $M[G]$ constructed by forcing will be selected as the judge.
5.3 Maximum time to execute
The maximum time to execute is naturally expressed by anumber in the model. In this paper, it is a
non-standard number, denoted by $n$ . Each day of the hanging is labeled by numbers 0, 1, 2, $\cdots,$ $n$ . The
first day is labeled 0, and the last day is $n$ .
5.4 The day of the hanging
The day of the hanging is determined by the number $x(\leq n)$ such that $\phi(x)$ is true in the model. It is
available that $\phi(x)$ is true for more than two values of $x$ . (Though this means that the hanging will be
executed more than two times.) In this paper, $\phi(a)$ is defined as a $\Pi_{1}$-formula meaning “The prisoner
cannot predict ahanging on the $(a-1)$-th day” as follows.
Let $f_{0}$ be the function defined by
$f_{0}(a)=(\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}(\ulcorner\exists x_{0}<a_{1})^{\urcorner}\mathrm{d}**(Sub(a,a_{1^{\urcorner\ulcorner}},x_{0^{\urcorner}})\ulcorner*)^{\urcorner}\ulcorner)$ ;
i.e.
$f_{0}$ : $\mathrm{N}arrow \mathrm{N}$
$\ulcorner\psi(a_{1})^{\urcorner}\vdasharrow\ulcorner((\exists x_{0}<a_{1})\psi(x_{0}))^{\urcorner}$ .
We define $\psi$ ( $a_{1}$ , a2) as
$\psi(a_{1}, a_{2})$
$\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}=$ $( \forall x_{1})\neg Prf_{T}(x_{1},(f_{0}(a_{2}), \ulcorner\vec{a},\vec{a})\urcorner)\frac{\mathrm{t}}{FSub}$,
where $\vec{a}=(a_{1}, a_{2})$ . We then set $\xi=\psi\ulcorner(a_{1}, a_{2})^{\urcorner}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}$, and define
$\phi(a_{1})=\psi(a_{1},\xi)\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}$ .
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Consequently, $\phi(a_{1})$ is a $\Pi_{1}$ -formula in the language of $\tilde{S}_{2}$ .
Then, $\tilde{S}_{2}^{1}$ proves
$\phi(0)$ $rightarrow$ $(\forall w)\neg Prf_{T}(w,(\ulcorner\exists x<0)\phi(x)^{\urcorner})$
$\phi(1)$ $rightarrow$ $(\forall w)\neg Prf_{T}(w,(\ulcorner\exists x<1)\phi(x)^{\urcorner})$
$\phi(2)$ $rightarrow$ $(\forall w)\neg P\eta_{T}(w,(\ulcorner\exists x<2)\phi(x)^{\urcorner})$
Trivially, $\phi(0)$ is equivalent to the consistency statement of $T$. It can be said that the formula $\phi(a)$ isan extension of the G\"odel sentence. Intuitively, $\phi(a)$ is aformalization of “The prisoner cannot predict ahanging on the $(a-1)$-th day.”
5.5 Predictability
Definition 4(Definitions of $\kappa_{2}$ ) $\kappa_{2}$ is a number such that
$T \vdash A(\vec{a})arrow \mathfrak{M}m\tau(\#^{\kappa_{2}}(a_{4}+2),(^{\ulcorner}A(\vec{a})^{\urcorner\ulcorner\neg}\frac{\iota}{FSub},a,\vec{a}))$,
where $\vec{a}=$ ($a_{1}$ ,a2, $a_{4}$ ) and $A(a_{1},a_{2},a_{4})$ is any $\Pi_{2}^{b}$ -formula,
$(a_{1}<\forall x\leq a_{2})$ $Thm_{T}(a_{4},( \eta,(\ulcorner x,a_{2})^{\urcorner}, (x,a_{2})))\frac{\iota}{FSub}$ .
($\eta$ is a G\"odel nurnber of a fomula.)
The existence of $\kappa_{2}$ is guaranteed ffom the theorem by Buss [3], since we assume $\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$. In contrast,the existence of $\kappa_{2}$ is not guaranteed if $\mathrm{P}\neq \mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$. Intuitively, $\#^{\kappa_{2}}(a+2)$ is an exponent of $|a|$ since $\mathrm{P}\neq \mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$.
Let $\tau(a)$ be aterm $\#^{\kappa_{2}^{2}}(a+2)$ . We define $\tau$-provability as predictability.
5.6 Preliminary description of pronouncements
We define $\phi(a_{1})$ to mean that ‘The hanging takae place on the $a_{1}$ -th day.’ For example, $\phi(0)$ meansthat ‘The hanging takes place on the first day.’ Let $a_{2}$ be afree variable denoting the maximum time toexecution. The first and second pronounoements depend on $\phi$ and $a_{2}$ , so they are denoted by $J_{1}(\phi, a_{2})$
and $J_{2}(\phi,a_{2})$ . More precise ones are given in Lemmas 2and 3.
Additionally, $\varphi(a_{1})$ is defined as $(\exists x_{0}<a_{1})\phi(x_{0})$ , i.e.
$\varphi(a_{1})=(\exists x_{0}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}<a_{1})\phi(x_{0})$ .
The first pronouncement is then naturally denoted by $\varphi(a_{2})$ . However, we make afurther claim aboutthe recognition by the prisoner. This claim is represented by uThere is ashort proof of the first pro
nouncement.” This is represented by a $\Sigma_{1^{-}}^{b}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{u}1\mathrm{a}\overline{\varphi}(a)$ defined by
$\overline{\varphi}(a_{2})=\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathbb{R}m_{T}(\sigma(a_{2}), FSub(^{\ulcorner}\varphi(a_{2})^{\urcorner\ulcorner},a_{2^{\urcorner}},a_{2}))$,
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where $\sigma(a_{2})$ is $(a_{2}+2)\#(a_{2}+2)$ .
The first pronouncement is then defined as
$J_{1}(\phi, a_{2})$ : $\varphi(a_{2})\wedge\overline{\varphi}(a_{2})$ .
Next, we present apreliminary formalization of the second pronouncement. The prisoner’s ability to
infer before he hears the pronouncements is defined as $T$ . The prisoner on the afternoon of the $(a_{1}-1)-$
th day knows that the hanging did not occur before the $a_{1}$ -th day. Therefore, it can be represented by
$T+\{(\forall x<a_{1})\neg\phi(x)\}$ .
‘The hanging on the $a_{1}$-th day cannot be predicted by the prisoner’ is intuitively represented by
There is no short proof of $\phi(a_{1})$ in $T+\{(\forall x<a_{1})\neg\phi(x)\}$ .
This is almost the same as
There is no short proof of $\varphi(a_{1}+1)$ in $T$
by deduction theorem. Let $\tau(a_{2})$ be $\#^{\kappa_{2}^{2}}(a_{2}+2)$ , where $\kappa_{2}$ is the number defined in Definition 4. This
term is the length bound on the proofs available to the prisoner. ‘The hanging on the $a_{1}$ -th day cannot
be predicted by the prisoner’ can then be represented by
$\neg Thm_{T}(\tau(a_{2}), FSub(^{\ulcorner}\varphi(a_{1}+1)^{\urcorner\ulcorner},a_{1^{\urcorner}}, a_{1}))$ .
The lawyer interprets the second pronouncement to mean that “If the prisoner can predict the day of
execution, the hanging cannot take place on that day.” Pronouncement $J_{2}$ ( $\phi$ , a2) is thus denoted by
$J_{2}(\phi, a_{2})$ : $(Thm_{T}(\tau(a_{2}), FSub(^{\ulcorner}\varphi(a_{1}+1)^{\neg\ulcorner},a_{1^{\urcorner}}, a_{1}))arrow\neg\phi(a_{1}))$ for all $a_{1}<a_{2}$ .
6Main theorem
Main Theorem. $B\neq \mathrm{I}$ implies $\mathrm{P}\neq \mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$.
The precise definitions of $B$ and Iwill be given in \S 6.2. The outline of the proof of our main theorem
is described as follows. More detailed explanations will be given in\S 6.1-\S 6.4
Outline of proof. Suppose $\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ and $B\neq \mathrm{I}$ . Our purpose is to show acontradiction.
(6.1 $T+\{\overline{\varphi}(n+1)\}+exp$ is consistent.) We show that there is acountable non-standard model, named
$N,$ of $T+\{\overline{\varphi}(n+1)\}+exp$ . $N$ will be used as the ground model of forcing. The existence of $N$ is proved
by Corollary 8.14 in [14]. Anon-standard number $n\in N$ , which means the maximum time to execution
minus one, will also be selected in this subsection.
(6.2 $T+\{\varphi(n+1)\}+\{\overline{\varphi}(n+1)\}$ is consistent.) Anon-standard model, $M[G]$ , of $T$ will be constructed
by forcing, which is the same method as [12]. $M[G]\models\overline{\varphi}(n+1)$ since the forcing extension on bounded
arithmetic preserves the basic properties of the ground model. On the other hand, $M[G]\models\varphi(n+1)$
is made true since anon-standard number $\alpha$ such that $M[G]\models\phi(\alpha)$ is added by forcing. Here, the
condition $B\neq \mathrm{I}$ is necessary for constructing the model $M[G]$ .
Then, we obtain $M[G]\models T+J_{1}(\phi, n+1)$ .
(6.3 $T+J_{1}(\phi,$ $n+1)+J_{2}(\phi,$ $n+1)$ is consistent.) The second pronouncement $J_{2}(\phi, n+1)$ is proved in
$T$ . This means $M[G]\models T+J_{1}(\phi, n+1)+J_{2}(\phi, n+1)$ .
133
(6.4 $T+J_{1}(\phi,$ $n+1)+J_{2}(\phi,$ $n+1)$ is inconsistent.) We show that $T+J_{1}(\phi, n+1)+J_{2}(\phi, n+1)$ implies
inconsistency.
Since $M[G]$ is amodel of $T$, we have 14$[G]\models 0=1$ . This is acontradiction. (End of outline)
6.1 $T+\{\overline{\varphi}(n+1)\}+exp$ is consistent.
Lemma 1There is a countable non-standard model $N$ of $T+e\varphi$ and a non-standard number $n\in N$
such that
$N\models\overline{\varphi}(n+1)$ ,
where $n1$ $1=2^{n_{0}}$ for some $n_{0}\in N$ .
We select acountable non-standard model $N$ and anon-standard number $n\in N$ , and use them
consistently in this paper.
6.2 $T+\{\varphi(n+1)\}+\{\overline{\varphi}(n+1)\}$ is consistent.
Definition 5(Definition of $M$) $M$ is defined as the initial segrnent of $N$ :
defM $=$ {x $\in N|$ there exists sorne $n\#$ \cdots $\# n$ such that x $\leq n\#$ \cdots $\# n$}.
Then, $M$ is amodel of $T$. Obviously,
Af $\models\overline{\varphi}(n+1)$ .
$M$ is determined according to the non-standard element $n\in N$ .
no is defined as $|n|$ . Let $B$ be the same as the Boolean algebra defined in [12]. Anew number, $\alpha$
$(<n+1)$ , which is probably not included in $M$, is added to model $M$ by forcing. Intuitively, this number
corresponds to the day of the hanging. Only the $a_{2}=n+1(=2^{n\mathrm{o}})$ case will be considered in the following
argument.
$\phi_{\nu}$ is defined by
$\phi_{\nu}(a_{1})=(\forall w\leq\#^{\nu}(n+1))\neg Prf_{T}(w, FSub(^{\ulcorner}\varphi(a_{1})^{\urcorner\ulcorner},a_{1^{\urcorner}},a_{1}))\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}$ .
The second-order bounded formula corresponding to $\phi_{\nu}(x)$ is denoted by the same symbol, $\phi_{\nu}(X)$ ,
where $X\mathrm{i}$ asubset of $\{i|i<n_{0}\}$ . Since any polynomial time computable function is represented by a
circuit, $\phi_{\nu}(X)$ can be translated into aBoolean circuit.
Let $\mathrm{C}_{\nu}$ be this $\mathrm{B}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\infty \mathrm{n}\mathrm{n}$ circuit. In it, each input terminal is labeled as avariable or aconstant (0 or
1). Without loss of generality, we can assume that $C_{\nu}$ has no input variable terminals and one output
terminal, because $|X|$ is always bounded by $n_{0}.$ Input variablae will be denoted by $x_{0},$ $x_{1},$ $\cdots,$ $x_{n_{\mathrm{O}}-1}.$ .
Nodes except for input terminals are called gates. They are labeled $\Lambda,$ $\vee$ , or $\neg$ . The gates of $\mathrm{C}_{\nu}$ can be
coded by acomputable function because $\phi_{\nu}(x)$ consists of polynomial time computable functions.
If we let $X$ be asubset of $\{i|i<n_{0}\}$ , we can regard $X$ as an input by setting $x:=1$ if $i\in X$ and
$x_{i}=0$ if $i\not\in X$ for any $i<n_{0}$ . The value of the output when $X$ is input into $\mathrm{C}_{\nu}$ is denoted by $C_{\nu}(X)$ .
$X_{G}$ is defined as afunction ffom $\{i|i<n_{0}\}$ to $B$
$X_{G}$ : $i\vdash*x:$ .
We define $i_{G}(X)$ as
$i_{G}(X)=\{x<y|X(x)\in G\}$ .
134
The value of the output when $X_{G}$ is input into $C_{\nu}$ is denoted by $C_{\nu}(X_{G});\alpha(<n+1)$ is defined as the
number corresponding to $X_{G}$ , i.e.
(The $j$-th bit of $\alpha$ ) $=1$ iff $j\in ic(X_{G})$ .
We transform $C_{\nu}$ into aconjunctive normal form, $\psi_{\nu}$ , in N. $C_{\nu}$ cannot be transformed into $\psi_{\nu}$ in $M$







where each $\psi_{\nu,i}(i\in 2^{\mathcal{K}_{\nu}})$ is called aclause. $\{x_{0}, \cdots, x_{n_{0}-1}\}$ are atomic Boolean variables, and $x_{j}$ and $\overline{x}_{j}$
correspond to Bit(j, $x$ ) $=1$ and Bit(j, $x$ ) $=0$ , respectively. $2^{\mathcal{K}_{\nu}}$ is the set of indexes of clauses. $C_{\nu,i}$ and
$\overline{C}_{\nu,i}$ are subsets of $\{j|j<n\mathrm{o}\}$ . We assume $C_{\nu,i}\cap\overline{C}_{\nu,i}=\emptyset$, because otherwise $j\in C_{\nu},:xj\vee _{j:}\in\overline{c}_{\nu},\overline{x}j=1$ ,
meaning it can be eliminated from the decomposition (1) of $\psi_{\nu}$ . However, $C_{\nu,i}\cup\overline{C}_{\nu,i}=\{j|j<n_{0}\}$ does
not generally hold.
We introduce the ideal Ithat will be used for the forcing.
Definition 6(Definitions of I) Iis defined as the $M_{0}$ -complete ideal generated frvrn
$\{\neg\psi_{\nu,i}|\nu\in \mathrm{N}, i\in 2^{\mathcal{K}_{\nu}}\}$ (2)
in $B$ , uyhere $\psi_{\nu,i}$ is the clause defined in (i).
More precisely, $b\in \mathrm{I}$ iff there is a function $\gamma$ : $carrow B$ such that
1. $c\in M_{0}$ ,
2. there is a finite subset $\{\neg\psi_{\nu_{1}^{k},i_{1}^{k}}, \cdots, \neg\psi_{\nu_{j_{k}}^{k},i_{\mathrm{j}_{k}}^{k}}\}$ of (2) such that
$\neg\psi_{\nu_{1}^{k},i_{1}^{k}}\vee\cdots\vee\neg\psi_{\nu_{\mathrm{j}_{k}}^{k},i_{j_{k}}^{k}}\geq\gamma(k)$ in fl
for all $k<c$ , and
3. $b\leq _{k<c}\gamma(k)$ .
Obviously, $\mathrm{I}\subseteq B$ . Icannot be defined in $M$ .
It is proved that for any $\nu\in \mathrm{N}$ and for any $i\in 2^{\mathcal{K}_{\nu}},$ $\{b\in B|b\leq\psi_{\nu,i}\}$ is definable and dense over I. There
does not exist an $\mathcal{M}$-generic maximal filter over Iwithout the condition $B\neq \mathrm{I}$, because it should be
contained in $B\backslash \mathrm{I}$ .
Definition 7 $G$ is an $A\mathit{4}$ -generic mairnal filter over I. $M[G]$ is defined in the same utay as in $f\mathit{1}\mathit{2}J$.
The existence of $G$ is guaranteed by the assumption $B\neq \mathrm{I}$ . Then, $M[G]$ is amodel of $T$ and $M[G]$ is a
bounded extension of $M$ by [12] since $\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ is assumed.
Lemma 2 $M[G]\models\varphi(n+1)\Lambda\overline{\varphi}(n+1)$
6.3 $T+J_{1}(\phi, n+1)+J_{2}(\phi, n+1)$ is consistent.
The formalization of the second pronouncement is proved by theory $T$ . It is strictly described as follows.
Lemma 3There is a finite number, $\kappa_{0}$ , such that for each value of $\kappa_{2}\geq\kappa_{0},\overline{S}_{2}^{1}$ proves
$a_{1}\leq a_{2},$ $Thm_{T}(\tau(a_{2}), FSub(^{\ulcorner}\varphi(a_{1}+1)^{\urcorner\ulcorner},a_{1^{\urcorner}}, a_{1}))arrow\neg\phi(a_{1})$,
where $\tau(a_{2})=\#^{\kappa_{2}^{2}}(a_{2}+2)$ . Furthermore, there is a polynomial function of $\kappa_{2}$ such that for each value of
$\kappa_{2}$ there is a proof for the above sequent, whose length is bounded by a polynomial function of $\kappa_{2}$ .
Then, we can conclude $M[G]\models T+J_{1}(\, n+1)+J_{2}(\phi, n+1)$ .
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Abstract
Anew approach to the $\mathrm{P}$ versus $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ problem based on $\mathrm{G}\{..A\mathrm{e}1’\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\infty$theorem and forcing
is proposed. The assertion that the paradox of the unexpected hanging ca be regardal as akind
of partial extension of the liar paradox is applied. Pronouncements are formah.zed in the language
of extended Buss’ bounded arithmetic. The pronouncements are shown to be both consistent and
inconsistent when $\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ and an assumption hold. As aconsequence, it is proved that
$\mathrm{P}\neq \mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ is
reducible from another separation problem of an ideal from aBoolean algebra.
Keywords
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1Introduction
The structure of weak arithmetic systems described by $S_{2}^{\dot{l}}$ , which is called bounded arithmetic, is closely
related to the structure of the polynomial time hierarchy. $\mathrm{P}\neq \mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ is said to be deducible ffom the
separation of bounded arithmetic theories. One $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{u}$-known method for separating arithmetic theories
combinae G\"odel’s incompleteness theorem and the truth definition (cf. \S 7.6 in [3], page 140 in [7], and
\S 10.5 in [8] $)$ . However, the separation of bounded arithmetic
$\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\infty \mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{e}$ has not yet been proved using
such amethod. This is because the truth definition of $\Sigma^{b}.\cdot$-formulas cannot be represented by abounded
formula in the language of $S_{2}$ (cf. [9]).
We generali $\mathrm{e}$ the above separation method by apPlying the pamdox of the $une\varphi ected$ hanging [4],
which is as follows. “One Saturday, the prisoner was told by the judge, ‘You will be hanged at noon
on one day next week. You will be hanged on aday you cannot predict.’ The prisoner’s lawyer proved
that the hanging could not be executed by making the following argument: ‘If the day of the hanging
is Saturday, the prisoner will be able to predict it Friday afternoon because Saturday is the last day
of the next week. This contradicts the judge’s second pronouncement. Saturday is thus excluded. The
execution can only take place on aday before Saturday. In the same way, each final day can be eliminated
one by one.’ ”
It is now asserted that this problem is not aparadox because the day of the hanging is not predictable
by the prisoner even if he (or she) makae full use of au the infomation \mbox{\boldmath $\omega$}ntain$\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ in the $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}o\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}c\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{s}$
(cf. [2]). The author agrees with this assertion. However, this problem can still be
$\mathrm{a}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\alpha 1$ to the
separation of logical systems, given the following observation: The paradox of the $une\varphi ected$ hanging
can be regarded as a kind of partial extension of the liar paradox. The separation method based on
G\"odel’s incompleteness theorem and the truth definition can be naturally generalized by applying this
observation. If we apply this generalized method to bounded arithmetic theories, the role of the truth
definition is replaced by forcing. The $\Lambda 4$-generic maximal filter constructed by forcing on bounded
arithmetic naturally corresponds to the number meaning the day of the hanging.
If we apply this method to the $\mathrm{P}$ versus NP problem, it is proved that $\mathrm{P}\neq \mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ is reducible from
another separation problem of an ideal Ifrom aBoolean algebra $B$ . (The precise definitions of
$B$ and I
will be given in \S 6.2.) The proof sketch is described as follows. Suppose
$\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ and $B\neq \mathrm{I}$. There is an
$\overline{*\mathrm{T}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}}$blong $\mathrm{d}$ to NTT East Corporation.
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6.4 $T+J_{1}(\phi, n+1)+J_{2}(\phi, n+1)$ is inconsistent.
Inconsistency of the pronouncements cannot be deduced by coding the lawyer’s logic because an extremely
long proof would be needed. The longer the maximum time to execution, the exponentially larger the
proof. There is not aterm capable of bounding such aseries of proofs. The assumption $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}=\infty-$-NP
makes it possible to deduce inconsistency using ashort proof.
Lemma 4 $T$ prvves
$a_{1}\leq a_{2},$ $\varphi(a_{2}),\overline{\varphi}(a_{2})arrow\varphi(a_{1})$ .
Proof of Main Theorem. Suppose $\mathrm{P}=\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ and B $\neq \mathrm{I}$. Lemmas 1-4 are thus true. If we set $a_{1}=0$
in the assertion of Lemma 4,
$T\vdash\varphi(a_{2}),\overline{\varphi}(a_{2})arrow(\exists x<0)\phi(x)$, (3)
since $\varphi(0)=(\exists x<0)\phi(x)$ by the definition of $\varphi$ . Let $M[G]$ be the model defined in Definition 7. Then,
$M[G]$ is amodel of $T$, so (3) implies
$M[G]\models\varphi(n+1)\wedge\overline{\varphi}(n+1)arrow(\exists x<0)\phi(x)$
if we set $a_{2}=n1$ $1$ . We have already proved $M[G]\models\varphi(n+1)\Lambda\overline{\varphi}(n+1)$ in Lemma 2. Hence,
$M[G]\models(\exists x<0)\phi(x)$ . This implies $M[G]\models(\exists x)(x<0)$ . However, $M[G]\models(\forall x)(x\geq 0)$ by the third
axiom of BASIC [3]. Hence, $M[G]\models 0=1$ . This is acontradiction. $\square$
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